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Abstract
According to liberal egalitarian ethics, individuals should be re-
warded for factors under their control, but not for factors outside
their control. A fundamental challenge to liberal egalitarian theories
of justice is how to do this without violating minimal egalitarian and
liberal requirements. The paper analyses the eﬀects of two such re-
quirements: the principle of equal reward and the principle of reward
independence. The exact formulations of these principles depend on
how we interpret the concept of reward. We propose two diﬀerent
definitions of reward, contrafactual and interpersonal reward, where
both can be given a general and narrow interpretation. Given this, we
show that it is impossible to establish a framework that is truly liberal
egalitarian in all respects and that a generalized version of the egali-
tarian equivalent mechanism is the most plausible liberal egalitarian
approach.
1 Introduction
Two fundamental ethical questions are what individual characteristics society
should reward and how it should reward them. According to an important
strand of liberal egalitarian ethics, agents should only be rewarded for factors
under their control and not for factors beyond their control (see among others
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Dworkin (1981), Arneson (1989), Cohen (1989), Le Grand (1991), Roemer
(1993, 1996, 1998), Bossert (1995), Fleurbaey (1994, 1995a,b,c,d) and Bossert
and Fleurbaey (1996)). Let us refer to factors under an agent’s control as
eﬀort and factors outside an agent’s control as talent. Liberal egalitarian
ethics can then be seen as consisting of two parts. First, the liberal principle
that agents should be held accountable for the eﬀort they choose to exercise,
which implies that agents should be rewarded for their eﬀort. We name
this the principle of responsibility. Second, the egalitarian principle that the
eﬀect of diﬀerences in talent should be eliminated, which implies that talent
should not be rewarded. We name this the principle of equalization.
In the context of income distribution, the principle of equalization implies
that all individuals exercising the same eﬀort should have the same income
(see Bossert (1995) and Bossert and Fleurbaey (1996)). However, the prin-
ciple of equalization does not tell us anything about how income should be
distributed among individuals exercising diﬀerent levels of eﬀort. It is, for
example, consistent with strict (or outcome) egalitarianism, but it also allows
for substantial inequalities in income as long as they correspond to diﬀerences
in eﬀort.
What about the principle of responsibility? One may argue that it jus-
tifies that individuals should be rewarded with their marginal productivity,
but this interpretation seems (at least) questionable in cases where talent
aﬀects marginal productivity (see also Tungodden (forthcoming)). Marginal
productivity reward implies that people are not only held accountable for the
eﬀort they choose, but also for their talent. Furthermore, it is well-known
that this interpretation of the principle of responsibility, in general, is not
compatible with the principle of equalization (Bossert (1995), Bossert and
Fleurbaey (1996)). Hence, a liberal egalitarian needs to consider alternative
interpretations of the principle of responsibility.
The purpose of this paper is to show how we may structure this investi-
gation by introducing some basic liberal egalitarian requirements on how to
reward eﬀort. We do this within the framework of a first best economy, which
often is seen as a limitation of the analysis. However, this is not the case for
the present study. Our aim is to understand the nature of the liberal egali-
tarian fairness argument for rewarding eﬀort, and for this purpose we want
to leave aside incentive considerations. 1 We do this by assuming that people
1Similarly, in a discussion of the nature of merit goods, it has turned out to be useful
to look at the implications of various definitions in first best economies before moving on
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have inelastic eﬀort supply with respect to the design of the redistribution
mechanism, which implies that all no-waste allocations of post-tax income
will be Pareto optimal (as long as we assume that people have self-interested
preferences and a positive marginal utility of income).
Within an egalitarian framework, it may seem trivial to argue that people
should be rewarded equally. But this is not the case. The exact nature of this
requirement, which we name the principle of equal reward, depends on how
we define reward. We consider two definitions of reward, contrafactual reward
and interpersonal reward, which both may be given a narrow and a general
interpretation. Given a contrafactual definition of reward, it turns out to be
impossible to satisfy both versions of the principle of equal reward. This is
important to have in mind when considering the liberal egalitarian framework
more generally. Even without taking into account incentive considerations, it
is impossible to establish a framework that is truly egalitarian in all respects.
For the interpersonal interpretations of reward, however, the principle of
equal reward is compatible with the principle of equalization, and, moreover,
characterizes a group of egalitarian redistribution mechanisms.
Liberal egalitarians only want to reward individuals for factors under
their control. Certainly, the choices of others are not within a person’s con-
trol, and thus another minimal liberal egalitarian requirement should be that
the reward scheme is independent of other people’s eﬀort. We name this the
principle of reward independence. The main results of this paper show how
diﬀerent versions of this requirement, together with the principle of equaliza-
tion, characterize a generalized version of the class of egalitarian equivalent
redistribution mechanisms introduced in Bossert and Fleurbaey (1996).
Even though our discussion is placed in the context of income distribu-
tion and eﬀort in the labour market, we should like to stress that the present
framework is relevant for a much broader set of policy issues. Let us briefly
illustrate this by considering such diﬀerent issues as health policy and inter-
regional redistribution. People make diﬀerent choices about how to live their
lives and these choices aﬀect the health risks they face and their expected
need for treatment. A recent report from the World Health Organization
shows that most of the leading risk factors contributing to the burden of
disease in high income countries can be attributed to unhealthy lifestyles
(WHO (2002, p. 163). The idea that individuals must take responsibility for
their own health is also an increasingly focused topic in the popular press. A
to second best analysis. See for example Schroyen (forthcoming).
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legitimate question is thus how the costs of treatment should be distributed
between diﬀerent individuals and to what extent the distribution of costs
should be related to individual behavior. Liberal egalitarians claim that peo-
ple who make informed and free choices should be held responsible for these
choices. However, holding individuals accountable for their choices in the
context of health care is extremely controversial. We believe that the main
reason for this is that the liberal egalitarian framework is given the wrong
interpretation. It is often assumed that responsibility for own health implies
that individuals who become sick should pay for their own treatment. But
this would imply that those who are unlucky or who are more disposed to
become sick are punished for factors beyond their control, which violates the
principle of equalization. Hence, it is important to have in mind that liberal
egalitarians only attempt to hold individuals accountable for their choices,
not for the consequences of their choices. But in the design of health policy,
what does it mean to hold people responsible for their choices if they are not
to pay the actual costs of treatment? By way of illustration, what does it
mean to reward individual eﬀort to reduce the expected need for treatment,
e.g., by not smoking? We believe that the present analysis may shed some
light on these questions as well, even though it is beyond the scope of this
paper to pursue this particular application of liberal egalitarian reasoning.
The question of how the distribution of burdens and benefits should be re-
lated to an agent’s eﬀort is also at the core of interregional fiscal equalization.
Local jurisdictions within the same country often have diﬀerent capacities to
raise revenue and face diﬀerent costs of providing public goods. This calls
for intergovernmental transfers. Fiscal equalization aims at reconciling two
important political principles in such situations. First, the principle that
diﬀerences in fiscal capacity among local jurisdiction should be eliminated,
which reflects a concern for interregional inequality being a result of factors
beyond the control of the local jurisdictions. Second, the principle that a
jurisdiction should be held responsible for decisions that are under their con-
trol, in particular their tax eﬀort, which reflects a concern for local autonomy.
The fundamental challenge for central governments is how to design a system
of intergovernmental transfer satisfying both these two principles, that is, a
transfer system that gives all local jurisdictions equal opportunities and at
the same time rewards their tax eﬀort. Also in this case, we believe that
both the reported results and the broader framework should be of value for
the policy debate.
The paper is organized as follows. After presenting the basic framework
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in section 2, we consider how to define the concept of reward in section
3. In sections 4 and 5, we study the principle of equal reward and the
principle of reward independence, and we show that the implications of these
principles depend crucially on how reward is defined. In section 6, using
the versions of the principle of reward independence compatible with the
principle of equalization, we provide several independent characterizations of
the generalized egalitarian equivalent mechanism. The final section provides
an overview of the analysis and some concluding comments.
2 The basic framework
Consider a society with a population N = {1, ..., n}, n ≥ 4. Let ΩE =
{e1, e2, ...} be the set of possible eﬀort levels, where emin is the eﬀort level
reflecting that a person does not work, andΩT = {t1, t2, ...} the set of possible
talent levels. ΩE ⊆ < and ΩT ⊆ <, where < is the set of real numbers.2 Let
ai = (a
E
i = e, a
T
i = t), where e ∈ ΩE and t ∈ ΩT , be a characteristics
vector of person i and a = (a1, ..., an) be a characteristics profile of society.
Define Ωi ⊂ <2 as the set of possible characteristics vectors of person i,
where for any i ∈ N and ai, a˜i ∈ Ωi, aTi = a˜Ti . In other words, we do not
consider interprofile conditions with respect to talent, but assume that there
is a unique characteristics profile of talent in society. In order to make the
model relevant for our study, though, we assume that there are diﬀerences
in talent, i.e., that there exist j, k ∈ N such that aTj 6= aTk . Beyond this, we
do not impose any restrictions on the characteristics profile of talents.
Let ΩEi be the set of eﬀort levels available for person i, where we assume
that ΩEi = ΩE,∀i ∈ N . We also assume that everyone can, at least, choose
between working and not working, i.e., ai = (emin, aTi ), a˜i = (a˜
E
i > e
min, aTi ) ∈
Ωi, ∀i ∈ N , but we do not impose any further restrictions on the set of eﬀort
levels. The framework thus covers both continuous and discrete cases. Define
a˚ as the situation where everyone exercises minimum eﬀort, i.e., a˚Ei = e
min,
∀i ∈ N . Finally, let E(a) represent the distribution of eﬀort in a, where, for
any e ∈ ΩE, Ee(a) is the cardinality of the set
©
i ∈ N | aEi = e
ª
. E¯ is the
set of all possible eﬀort distributions.
In most of the analysis, we will assume that ΩN = Ω1× Ω2 × ...× Ωn is
the set of possible characteristics profiles of society, where ΩN ⊆ <2n . In the
2Hence, we do not consider the multidimensional version of this problem; see Bossert
(1995) and Bossert and Fleurbaey (1996).
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final part, however, we assume restricted domain richness, i.e., we demand
that every talent group in society is represented on every chosen eﬀort level in
a particular situation. Formally speaking, this implies that the set of possible
characteristics profiles of society is given by Ω¯N = {a ∈ ΩN |for any j, k ∈ N ,
where aTj 6= aTk , there exists l,m ∈ N such that aEl = aEj , aEm = aEk , aTl = aTk ,
and aTm = a
T
j }. This should be a straightforward assumption to make when
studying redistribution in large societies, and nothing of importance seems
to be lost by restricting the domain in this way.
The pre-tax income function f : Ω→ <, where Ω = ΩE×ΩT , is assumed
to be strictly increasing in eﬀort and talent, where f(emin, t) = 0, ∀t ∈
ΩT . Moreover, we assume that f is not additively separable, i.e., there exist
e1, e2 ∈ ΩE and j, k ∈ N such that f(e2, aTj )−f(e1, aTj ) > f(e2, aTk )−f(e1, aTk ).
We only pay attention to information about eﬀort and talent when choosing
allocations, and thus our object of study can be described as a redistribution
mechanism F : ΩN → <n (or, in the final part, F : Ω¯N → <n). We assume
that F satisfies the no-waste condition
Pn
i=1 Fi(a) =
Pn
i=1 f(ai), ∀a ∈ ΩN .
The analysis will take place within the framework of some basic condi-
tions. First, we will only consider anonymous redistribution mechanism (even
though we only use this restriction explicitly in some parts of the analysis).
Anonymity (A): For any a,ã ∈ ΩN and j, k ∈ N , [aTj = aTk , aEj = a˜Ek ,
aEk = a˜
E
j and a
E
i = a˜
E
i , ∀i 6= j, k]→ [Fj(a) = Fk(a˜), Fk(a) = Fj(a˜) and
Fi(a) = Fi(a˜ ),∀i 6= j, k].
More importantly, the underlying aim of the analysis will be to see how
we can reward eﬀort within a framework satisfying the core liberal egalitarian
principle of equalization, to wit that people exercising the same eﬀort should
receive the same post-tax income.
Equal Income for Equal Eﬀort (EIEE): For any a ∈ ΩN and i, j ∈ N,
[aEi = a
E
j ]→ [Fi(a) = Fj(a)].
An important group of redistribution mechanisms, the class of egalitarian
equivalent mechanisms, was introduced and characterized by Bossert and
Fleurbaey (1996). In the present framework, we may write this class as
follows.
FEEk (a) = f(t, a
E
k ) − 1n
P
i∈N
£
f(t, aEk )− f(ai)
¤
, for some t ∈ ΩT and
∀k ∈ N , ∀a ∈ ΩN .
For any given reference talent t ∈ ΩT , an egalitarian equivalent mecha-
nism assigns to every individual a post-tax income that consists of two parts.
The first part is a transfer equal to the pre-tax income she would have had if
her talent were equal to the reference talent. This creates an overall deficit
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or surplus and the second part is a uniform transfer to all individuals that
balances the budget. In the following, we will show that a generalized version
of FEE is the most plausible liberal egalitarian approach on how eﬀort should
be rewarded.
3 What is a reward?
In order to analyze how eﬀort is to be rewarded, we need a definition of the
concept of reward. Intuitively, one may think of reward as the additional
you get because you exercise a certain level of eﬀort rather than another.
This formulation, however is not suﬃciently precise. In order to measure
how much a person is rewarded, we need to know who to compare with. Two
main alternatives are possible. We may either compare with the eﬀort the
person herself exercises in another situation or we may compare with the
eﬀort another person exercises in the same situation. A reward can thus be
defined either through contrafactual comparisons or through interpersonal
comparisons.
3.1 Contrafactual reward
According to the contrafactual definition, a reward is the increase in post-tax
income of a person when she increases her eﬀort. The most general version
covers all cases where such a change takes place.
Definition 1 General Contrafactual Reward (GCR). For any a, a˜ ∈ ΩN and
k ∈ N , where aEk > a˜Ek , contrafactual reward is defined by Fk(a)− Fk(a˜).
Alternatively, we may narrow our definition of contrafactual reward to
situations where only the person in question makes a change in eﬀort.
Definition 2 Narrow Contrafactual Reward (NCR): For any a, a˜ ∈ ΩN and
k ∈ N, where aEk > a˜Ek and a˜Ei = aEi , ∀i 6= k, contrafactual reward is defined
by Fk(a)− Fk(a˜).
Wewill shortly see how these definitions can be used to impose restrictions
on how to reward eﬀort within a liberal egalitarian framework.
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3.2 Interpersonal reward
Contrafactual reward has strong intuitive appeal, but still it does not seem
to capture fully our understanding of reward. Consider, for example, the
strict egalitarian redistribution mechanism giving everyone the same income
independent of their eﬀort. Clearly, in one way, this redistribution mechanism
cannot be said to reward eﬀort at all. However, according to both versions of
contrafactual reward, the person is given a positive reward when increasing
her eﬀort.
In contrast, the interpersonal definition views reward as the diﬀerence be-
tween what two persons get in a given situation. In the most general version,
the definition covers all comparisons between persons exercising diﬀerent lev-
els of eﬀort.
Definition 3 General Interpersonal Reward (GIR). For any a ∈ ΩN and
j, k ∈ N , where aEj > aEk , interpersonal reward is defined by Fj(a)− Fk(a).
Clearly, if a person’s post-tax income partly depends on her talent, then
sometimes the general version of interpersonal reward will not only capture
diﬀerences in post-tax income due to diﬀerences in eﬀort.
This problem is avoided if we apply a more narrow definition of interper-
sonal reward.
Definition 4 Narrow Interpersonal Reward (NIR). For any a ∈ ΩN and
j, k ∈ N, where aTj = aTk and aEj > aEk , interpersonal reward is defined by
Fj(a)− Fk(a).
The narrow definition of interpersonal reward only covers comparisons
between people with the same talent, where diﬀerences in post-tax income
solely can be explained by diﬀerences in eﬀort.
We will now put the four definitions into work and study how they can be
used to impose restrictions on how to reward eﬀort within a liberal egalitarian
framework.
4 Equal reward
The principle of equalization implies that people are rewarded equally in
some situations. First, if two persons make the same change in eﬀort when
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moving from one situation to another, then EIEE implies that they receive
the same contrafactual reward. Second, in a given situation, EIEE implies
that two persons being at the same eﬀort level receive the same interpersonal
reward (independently of whom they are compared with).
However, we propose that the principle of equal reward should be inter-
preted more broadly within an egalitarian framework, and we now consider
how to formulate this more precisely and the implications of imposing the
various interpretations of the principle of equal reward on the redistribution
mechanism.
4.1 Equal contrafactual reward
First, let us consider the demand for equal general contrafactual reward, to
wit, that an increase in post-tax income following a given increase in eﬀort
should be independent of the person’s talent (but not necessarily independent
of what others do). In order to see how to formulate this requirement more
precisely, consider a situation a where two individuals j and k exercise the
same eﬀort level. Compare this to two other situations a˜, aˆ, where everyone
but j and k makes the same change when moving from a to a˜ as from a
to aˆ. In this respect, the move from a to a˜ is identical to the move from a
to aˆ. Moreover, assume that the only diﬀerence between a˜ and aˆ is that j
exercises the same eﬀort level in a˜ as k in aˆ and vice versa. In this case,
we propose that equal general contrafactual reward implies that the change
in post-tax income for j when moving from a to a˜ should be equal to the
change in post-tax income for k when moving from a to aˆ.
Equal General Contrafactual Reward (EGCR): For any a, a˜, aˆ ∈ ΩN and
j, k ∈ N , [aEj = aEk 6= a˜Ej = aˆEk , aˆEj = a˜Ek a˜Ei = aˆEi , ∀i 6= j, k ] → [Fj(a˜) −
Fj(a) = Fk(aˆ)− Fk(a)].3
EGCR is a strong egalitarian claim and it turns out that it is not com-
patible with a redistribution mechanism satisfying no-waste.
Proposition 1. There does not exist any redistribution mechanism F
satisfying EGCR.
Proof. (1) Suppose F satisfies EGCR. f is not additively separable and
hence there exist j, k ∈ N and e1, e2 ∈ ΩE such that f(e2, aTj )− f(e1, aTj ) >
f(e2, aTk )− f(e1, aTk ).
3Notice that we do not demand that a˜ and aˆ are distinct alternatives, i.e. the condition
also covers the situation where j and k move together from one eﬀort level to another.
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(2) Consider any a, a˜, aˆ, a¯ ∈ ΩN where aEi = aEj = e1 6= a¯Ei = a¯Ej =
e2,∀i ∈ N , a˜Ei = aˆEi = e2, ∀i 6= j, k, a˜Ej = e2 > aˆEj = e1, a˜Ek = e1 and aˆEk = e2.
By EGCR, Fj(a˜) − Fj(a) = Fk(aˆ) − Fk(a), Fi(a˜) − Fi(a) = Fj(a˜) − Fj(a),
∀i 6= k and Fi(aˆ)− Fi(a) = Fk(aˆ)− Fk(a), ∀i 6= j.
(3) By the no-waste condition,
P
i∈N(Fi(a˜)−Fi(a)) =
P
i∈N(f(a˜i)−f(ai))
and
P
i∈N(Fi(aˆ)−Fi(a)) =
P
i∈N(f(aˆi)−f(ai)). By taking into account (2),
it is easily seen that (n−1) (Fj(a˜)−Fj(a)) + (Fk(a˜)−Fk(a)) =
P
i∈N(f(a˜i)−
f(ai)) and (n− 1) (Fk(aˆ)−Fk(a)) + (Fj(aˆ)−Fj(a)) =
P
i∈N(f(aˆi)− f(ai)).
(4) By (1), it follows that
P
i∈N(f(a˜i) − f(ai)) >
P
i∈N(f(aˆi) − f(ai)).
Hence, taking into account (3), it follows that (Fj(a˜) − Fj(a)) + (Fk(a˜) −
Fk(a)) > (Fk(aˆ)−Fk(a)) + (Fj(aˆ)−Fj(a)). By (2), this can be simplified to
Fk(a˜)− Fk(a) > Fj(aˆ)− Fj(a).
(5) By ECGR, Fj(a¯)−Fj(a) = Fk(a¯)−Fj(a). But this can be written as
(Fj(a¯)− Fj(aˆ)) + (Fj(aˆ)− Fj(a)) = (Fk(a¯)− Fk(a˜)) + (Fk(a˜)− Fk(a)). By
ECGR, Fj(a¯)−Fj(aˆ)= Fk(a¯)−Fk(a˜), and hence Fj(aˆ)−Fj(a)= Fk(a˜)−Fk(a).
But this contradicts (4) and the result follows.
Hence, if people diﬀer in talent and talent aﬀects marginal productivity,
then we cannot fulfill the demand of equal general contrafactual reward.
There are, however, redistribution mechanisms satisfying the weaker de-
mand of equal narrow contrafactual reward, which only covers situations
where there is a change in eﬀort of only one person.4 To illustrate, consider
a situation a where two individuals j and k exercise the same eﬀort level,
say, e1. Compare this to two other situations a˜, aˆ, where the only thing hap-
pening when moving from a to a˜ is that j increases her eﬀort from e1 to e2,
and the only thing happening when moving from a to aˆ is that k increases
her eﬀort from e1 to e2. Equal narrow contrafactual reward demands that
the change in post-tax income of j when moving from a to a˜ should be the
same as the change in post-tax income for k when moving from a to aˆ.
Equal Narrow Contrafactual Reward (ENCR): For any a, a˜, aˆ ∈ ΩN and
j, k ∈ N , [aEj = aEk < a˜Ej = aˆEk , a˜Ei = aEi , ∀i 6= j, and aˆEi = aEi , ∀i 6= k ] →
[Fj(a˜)− Fj(a) = Fk(aˆ)− Fk(a)].
4To see this, consider the redistribution mechanism consisting of the following two
parts. First, each individual is given a transfer equal to the pre-tax income she would
have had if her talent were equal to the most talented and, second, everyone is sharing
equally in the surplus or deficit generated by the first part for all other persons (but not
for themselves). This redistribution mechanism satisfies ECR, where narrow contrafactual
reward equals the marginal productivity of the most talented.
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It turns out, however, to be impossible to satisfy even this very weak
version of the principle of equal reward within a framework satisfying the
other core idea of liberal egalitarianism.
Proposition 2. There does not exist any redistribution mechanism F
satisfying ENCR and EIEE.
Proof. (1) Suppose F satisfies both ENCR and EIEE. f is not additively
separable and thus there exist j, k ∈ N where aTj 6= aTk and e1, e2 ∈ ΩE such
that (f(e2, aTj )− f(e1, aTj )) 6= (f(e2, aTk )− f(e1, aTk )).
(2) Consider some a, a˜, aˆ, a¯ ∈ ΩN , where aEi = e1,∀i ∈ N , a˜Ei = aEi , ∀i 6=
j, aˆEi = a
E
i , ∀i 6= k, a¯Ei = aEi , ∀i 6= j, k, a˜Ej = aˆEk = e2, and a¯Ej = a¯Ek = e2.
(3) By EIEE, Fj(a) = Fk(a). Moreover, by ENCR, Fj(a˜) − Fj(a) =
Fk(aˆ)− Fk(a).
(4) By EIEE, Fj(a¯) = Fk(a¯). Moreover, by ENCR, Fj(a¯) − Fj(aˆ) =
Fk(a¯)− Fk(a˜). Hence, Fj(aˆ) = Fk(a˜) and, taking into account the first part
of (3), Fj(aˆ)− Fj(a) = Fk(a˜)− Fk(a).
(5) By EIEE, Fi(a˜) = Fk(a˜), ∀i 6= j and Fi(aˆ) = Fj(aˆ), ∀i 6= k. Hence,
by no-waste, (n− 1)(Fj(aˆ)− Fj(a)) + (Fk(aˆ)− Fk(a)) = f(aˆk)− f(ak) and
(n−1)(Fk(a˜)−Fk(a)) + (Fj(a˜)−Fj(a)) = f(a˜j)−f(aj), i.e., Fj(aˆ)−Fj(a) =
1
n−1 [(f(aˆk)−f(ak))− (Fk(aˆ)−Fk(a))] and Fk(a˜)−Fk(a)=
1
n−1 [(f(a˜j)−f(aj))
− (Fj(a˜)− Fj(a))].
(6) By (4) and (5), [(f(aˆk)−f(ak)) − (Fk(aˆ)−Fk(a))] = [(f(a˜j)−f(aj)) −
(Fj(a˜)−Fj(a))]. By (3), this can be simplified to f(a˜j)−f(aj)= f(aˆk)−f(ak).
But this contradicts (1) and the result follows.
Proposition 1 and Proposition 2 make clear that, even without taking
into account incentive considerations, it is not possible to establish a redis-
tribution mechanism that is truly egalitarian in all respects.
Proposition 1 shows that this is partly due to the fact that we do not want
to waste resources. If we were ready to give up the no-waste condition, then
we could easily establish a redistribution mechanism satisfying EGCR. By
way of illustration, consider the redistribution mechanism giving everyone a
post-tax income equal to the pre-tax income they would have had if they had
the talent of the least talented (and where the rest of the total pre-tax income
is wasted). In this case, the contrafactual reward is the same for everyone
and equal to the marginal productivity of the least advantaged. This redis-
tribution mechanism also satisfies EIEE and hence reconciles the demands of
the principle of equalization with the demands of equal contrafactual reward.
Proposition 2, however, shows that this is not at all possible within a
framework satisfying the no-waste condition. Given the no-waste condition,
11
there is a fundamental conflict between these two basic egalitarian ideals. If
we aim at giving people the same contrafactual reward in situations where
this is possible, then we cannot at the same time always assign equal income
to people exercising the same eﬀort.
4.2 Equal interpersonal reward
Given an interpersonal definition of reward, we also have two possible inter-
pretations of the principle of equal reward. The demand of equal general
interpersonal reward states that if two situations are equal in all other re-
spects than that the eﬀort levels of two individuals, j and k, are permuted
with the eﬀort levels of two other people, l and m, then the post-tax income
diﬀerence between l and m in the new situation should be the same as the
post-tax income diﬀerence between j and k in the initial situation.
Equal General Interpersonal Reward (EGIR): For any a, a˜ ∈ ΩN and
j, k, l,m ∈ N , [aEj = a˜El , a˜Ej = aEl , aEk = a˜Em, a˜Ek = aEm, aEj 6= aEk and aEi = a˜Ei ,
∀i 6= j, k, l,m ]→ Fj(a)− Fk(a) = Fl(a˜)− Fm(a˜).
EGIR should have strong egalitarian appeal. If we want to reward dif-
ferences in eﬀort equally, then it is hard to see how to justify a diﬀerence in
general interpersonal reward in situations covered by EGIR.
Immediately, we can notice that EGIR is equivalent to claiming that
general interpersonal reward should be the same in all situations where the
overall eﬀort structure is the same (and not only in all situations were every-
thing else is equal).
Lemma 1. The redistribution mechanism F satisfies EGIR if and only
if for any a, a˜ ∈ ΩN and j, k, l,m ∈ N , where aEj = a˜El , a˜Ej = aEl , aEk = a˜Em,
a˜Ek = a
E
m, a
E
j 6= aEk and E(a) = E(a˜), Fj(a)− Fk(a) = Fl(a˜)− Fm(a˜).
Proof. The if part.
(1) It follows from observing that E(a) = E(a˜) in all situations covered
by EGIR.
The only-if part
(2) Consider any a, a˜ ∈ ΩN and j, k, l,m ∈ N , where aEj = a˜El , a˜Ej = aEl ,
aEk = a˜
E
m, a˜
E
k = a
E
m, a
E
j 6= aEk , andE(a) = E(a˜). It follows that the cardinality
NˆC(a, a˜) of the set Nˆ(a, a˜) =
©
i 6= j, k, l,m | aEi 6= a˜Ei
ª
is 0 ≤ NˆC(a, a˜) ≤
n−4. If NˆC(a, a˜) = 0, then it follows from EGIR that Fj(a)−Fk(a) = Fl(a˜)−
Fm(a˜). By the fact that E(a) = E(a˜), NˆC(a, a˜) 6= 1. We will now prove that
for any NˆC(a, a˜) > 1, there exists aˆ ∈ ΩN such that NˆC(a, a˜)− NˆC(aˆ, a˜) ≥ 2,
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aEi = aˆ
E
i ,∀i /∈ Nˆ(a, a˜), E(a) = E(aˆ) and Fj(a)− Fk(a) = Fj(aˆ)− Fk(aˆ).
(3) If NˆC(a, a˜) > 1, there exist some r, s, u, v 6= j, k, l,m (where r, s
are not necessarily distinct from u, v) such that aEi 6= a˜Ei , i = r, s, u, v and
aEu = a˜
E
r and a
E
v = a˜
E
s . Consider a
1 ∈ ΩN , where a1Eu = aEj , a1Ej = aEu ,
a1Ev = a
E
k , a
1E
k = a
E
v , and a
1E
i = a
E
i , ∀i 6= j, k, u, v. By EGIR, Fj(a)− Fk(a)˙
= Fu(a1)− Fv(a1).
(4) Consider a2 ∈ ΩN , where a2Eu = a1Er , a2Er = a1Eu , a2Ev = a1Es , a2Es = a1Ev ,
and a2Ei = a
1E
i , ∀i 6= r, s, u, v. By EGIR, we have that Fu(a1) − Fv(a1) =
Fr(a
2)− Fs(a2).
(5) Consider a3 ∈ ΩN , where a3Ej = a2Er , a3Er = a2Ej , a3Ek = a2Es , a3Es = a2Ek ,
and a3Ei = a
2E
i , ∀i 6= j, k, r, s. By EGIR, Fr(a2)− Fs(a2) = Fj(a3)− Fk(a3).
(6) By (3) - (5), it follows that Fj(a) − Fk(a) = Fj(a3) − Fk(a3), aEi =
a3Ei , ∀i 6= r, s, u, v, a3Er = a˜Er and a3Es = a˜Es . Hence, NˆC(a, a˜)− NˆC(a3, a˜) ≥ 2
and E(a) = E(a3), and we have established the result promised in (2).
(7) From (6), it follows straightforwardly by induction that Fj(a)−Fk(a) =
Fj(a¯) − Fk(a¯), where NˆC(a¯, a˜) = 0 and aEi = a¯Ei , ∀i /∈ Nˆ(a, a˜). By EGIR,
Fj(a¯)− Fk(a¯) = Fl(a˜)− Fm(a˜) and the result follows.
Given EIEE, EGIR narrows the class of admissible redistribution mecha-
nisms. To see this, let us first define the function r˜ : ΩE× E¯ → <.5 Consider
now the following class of egalitarian redistribution mechanisms, which in-
cludes the egalitarian equivalent mechanism FEE as a special case.
FGEk (a) = r˜(a
E
k , E(a))− 1n
P
i∈N
£
r˜(aEk , E(a))− f(ai)
¤
,∀k ∈ N , ∀a ∈ ΩN .
FGE consists of two parts. The first part may depend both on absolute
and relative eﬀort performance of a person, the second part is a uniform
transfer to everyone that balances the budget.
It turns out that we have to adopt FGE if we endorse EGIR and EIEE.6
Proposition 3. The redistribution mechanism F satisfies EGIR and
EIEE if and only if F = FGE.
Proof. The if part.
(1) Let us show that FGE satisfies EGIR. For any j, k, l,m ∈ N and
a, a˜ ∈ ΩN , we have that FGEj (a) - FGEk (a) = r˜(aEj , E(a)) - r˜(aEk , E(a)) and
FGEl (a˜) - F
GE
m (a˜) = r˜(a˜
E
l , E(a˜)) - r˜(a˜
E
m, E(a˜)). The result follows by observing
5Let r˜(e,E(a)) = 0 if e is not chosen in a.
6The framework of FGE excludes a number of egalitarian redistribution mechanisms
satisfying EIEE. By way of illustration, it does not include the proportional egalitarian
equivalent mechanism and the subgroup solidarity mechanism discussed in Cappelen and
Tungodden (2003).
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that E(a) = E(a˜), aEj = a˜
E
l and a
E
k = a˜
E
m in all cases covered by EGIR. It is
easily seen that FGE satisfies EIEE.
The only-if part.
(2) From Lemma 1, it follows that for any two eﬀort levels, a diﬀerence
in interpersonal reward can only be due to a diﬀerence in the overall eﬀort
structure in society. From EIEE, it follows that there should never be any
diﬀerence in post-tax income between two persons exercising the same eﬀort.
Hence, it is possible to define some r˜ : ΩE×E¯ → < such that for any a ∈ ΩN
and any j ∈ N :
Fj(a)− F1(a) = r˜(aEj , E(a))− r˜(aE1 , E(a)),
.
.
.
Fj(a)− Fn(a) = r˜(aEj , E(a))− r˜(aEn , E(a)).
(3) It follows from (2) that nFj(a)−
P
i∈N Fi(a) = nr˜(a
E
j , E(a)) −
P
i∈N
r˜(aEi , E(a)). By the no-waste condition,
P
i∈N Fi(a) =
P
i∈N fi(a) and hence
we have that Fj(a) = r˜(aEj , E(a))− 1n
P
i∈N
£
r˜(aEi , E(a)− f(ai)
¤
. The result
follows.
FEE implies that interpersonal reward is independent of the overall eﬀort
structure. But there are other possibilities within the framework of FGE. To
illustrate, let θC(aEk ) be the cardinality of the set θ(aEk ) =
©
i ∈ N | aEi > aEk
ª
.
Consider now the following rank order dependent class of redistribution mech-
anisms.
FROEk (a) = r˜(a
E
k , θC(aEk )) − 1n
P
i∈N
£
r˜(aEk , θC(aEk ))− f(ai)
¤
,∀k ∈ N ,
∀a ∈ ΩN .
FROE assigns interpersonal reward both on the basis of absolute and
relative performance. It is easily seen that FROE satisfies EIEE and EGIR.
However, in the next section, we will argue that it violates a fundamental
liberal egalitarian intuition, and for that reason is not a plausible liberal
egalitarian redistribution mechanism.
Finally, let us consider the implications of imposing the weaker version of
equal interpersonal reward on the redistribution mechanism, where we only
deal with comparisons between equally talented individuals.
Equal Narrow Interpersonal Reward (ENIR): For any a, a˜ ∈ ΩN and
j, k, l,m ∈ N , where aTj = aTk = aTl = aTm, [aEj = a˜El , a˜Ej = aEl , aEk = a˜Em, a˜Ek =
aEm, a
E
j 6= aEk and aEi = a˜Ei , ∀i 6= j, k, l,m ]→ Fj(a)−Fk(a) = Fl(a˜)−Fm(a˜).
It turns out that this is a very weak requirement that is satisfied by all
anonymous redistribution mechanisms.
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Proposition 4. If the redistribution mechanism F satisfies A, then it
satisfies ENIR.
Proof. (1) Consider any a, a˜ ∈ ΩN and j, k, l,m ∈ N , where aTj = aTk =
aTl = a
T
m and a
E
j = a˜
E
l , a˜
E
j = a
E
l , a
E
k = a˜
E
m, a˜
E
k = a
E
m, a
E
j 6= aEk and aEi = a˜Ei ,
∀i 6= j, k, l,m.
(2) Consider aˆ, where aˆEj = a
E
l , aˆ
E
l = a
E
j and a
E
i = aˆ
E
i ,∀i 6= j, l. By A,
Fl(aˆ) = Fj(a), Fj(aˆ) = Fl(a) and Fi(aˆ) = Fi(a),∀i 6= j, l.
(3) By A, Fk(a˜) = Fm(aˆ), Fm(a˜) = Fk(aˆ) and Fi(a¯) = Fi(aˆ),∀i 6= k,m.
(4) By (2) - (3), it follows that Fj(a) = Fl(a˜) and Fk(a) = Fm(a˜), i.e.
Fj(a)− Fk(a) = Fl(a˜)− Fm(a˜).
4.3 Overview on equal reward
In summary, the analysis in this section shows that the contrafactual inter-
pretation of equal reward is too demanding. It is in general impossible to
satisfy general contrafactual reward and, moreover, the weaker version is not
consistent with a framework satisfying EIEE. Equal interpersonal reward, on
the other hand, turns out to be compatible with the principle of equalization.
The weaker version is satisfied by any anonymous redistribution mechanism,
whereas the stronger version (together with EIEE) characterizes a broad class
of redistribution mechanisms.
5 Reward Independence
We will argue that liberal egalitarians should not be concerned with relative
performance when rewarding eﬀort (as is case for the rank order dependent
class of redistribution mechanisms FROE). Liberal egalitarians aim at re-
warding what is within the control of individuals, and hence should require
what we refer to as reward independence. In the case of interpersonal reward,
reward independence says that the reward assigned to a person increasing
her eﬀort should be independent of what others do. It is the choice of this
person a liberal egalitarian wants to reward and not the possible fact that,
say, this person ends up being the one exercising most eﬀort in society. The
relative position of an individual is beyond her control and thus should not
aﬀect the structure of the reward scheme. Similarly, in the case of interper-
sonal reward, liberal egalitarians should be concerned with the diﬀerence in
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choice between two individuals and not their relative positions (which are
beyond their control).
Notice that the principle of reward independence has no egalitarian con-
tent. All versions are compatible with pure libertarianism, where no redis-
tribution takes place. Hence, it is an independent requirement of a very
diﬀerent kind than the principle of equalization and the principle of equal re-
ward. But it follows directly from the liberal egalitarian idea of only keeping
people responsible for factors within their control. We now consider how to
formulate these conditions more precisely and the implications of imposing
them on the redistribution mechanism.
5.1 Contrafactual reward independence
The requirement that general contrafactual reward should be independent of
the eﬀort of other individuals can be stated formally as follows.
General Contrafactual Reward Independence (GCRI): For any a, a˜, aˆ, a¯ ∈
ΩN and k ∈ N , [aEk = a˜Ek 6= aˆEk = a¯Ek ,]→ [Fk(a)− Fk(aˆ) = Fk(a˜)− Fk(a¯)].7
This is clearly a very demanding condition, and not surprisingly it has
strong implications for the kind of redistribution mechanism we may adopt.
Proposition 5. A redistribution mechanism F satisfies GCRI if and
only if for any a, a˜ ∈ ΩN and person k ∈ N, Fk(a)− Fk(a˜) = f(ak)− f(a˜k).
Proof. The if part is trivial and hence we will only prove the only-if part.
(1) Suppose there exist some a, a˜ ∈ ΩN and k ∈ N , where Fk(a)−Fk(a˜) 6=
f(ak)− f(a˜k).
(2) If aEk = a˜
E
k , then the supposition in (1) implies that Fk(a) 6= Fk(a˜).
By domain richness, there exists aˆ ∈ ΩN , where aˆEk 6= aEk . By GCRI, Fk(a)−
Fk(aˆ) = Fk(a˜)− Fk(aˆ). But this implies that Fk(a) = Fk(a˜), and hence the
supposition in (1) is not possible if aEk = a˜
E
k .
(3) Assume that aEk 6= a˜Ek . By domain richness, there exists some a¯ ∈ ΩN ,
where a¯Ek = a
E
k and a¯
E
i = a˜
E
i , ∀i 6= k. By (2), Fi(a¯) = Fi(a˜),∀i 6= k. Hence,
by the no-waste condition, Fk(a¯)− Fk(a˜) = f(a¯k) − f(a˜k) = f(ak)− f(a˜k).
But by GCRI, Fk(a¯) − Fk(a˜) = Fk(a) − Fk(a˜) 6= f(ak) − f(a˜k), and hence
the supposition in (1) is not possible. The result follows.
The underlying intuition is straightforward. If some person, say k, gets
more (less) than her marginal productivity when increasing eﬀort, then there
7Given the no-waste condition, GCRI is equivalent to the individual monotonicity
condition introduced by Bossert (1995) and Bossert and Fleurbaey (1996).
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will be created a deficit (surplus) that, given the no-waste condition, must
be distributed among the others. However, it is easily seen that this implies
that some other people’s general contrafactual reward will depend on what
k does, which violates GCRI.
Proposition 5 shows that there is a close link between GCRI and the
libertarian redistribution mechanism.
FLk (a) = f(ak), ∀k ∈ N , ∀a ∈ ΩN .
It turns out that we can characterize FL by combining GCRI with the
following very plausible condition.
No Redistribution for Equal Eﬀort and Equal Pre-tax Income (NREEP):
For any a ∈ ΩN , [ aE1 = aE2 = ... = aEn and f(a1) = f(a2) = ... = f(an) ]→ [
F1(a) = F2(a) = ... = Fn(a) ].
Corollary 1. A redistribution mechanism F satisfies GCRI and NREEP
if and only if F = FL.
Proof. The if part is trivial and hence we will only prove the only-if part.
(1) Consider any a ∈ ΩN and k ∈ N . We will now show that given the
assumptions of the corollary, Fk(a) = f(ak). By domain richness, there exists
a˚ ∈ ΩN ,where a˚E1 = a˚E2 = ... = a˚En = emin and f (˚a1) = f (˚a2) = ... = f (˚an) =
0. By NREEP and the no-waste condition, F1(˚a) = F2(˚a) = ... = Fn(˚a) = 0 .
Hence, Fk(˚a) = f (˚ak).
(2) By Proposition 5, Fk(a)−Fk(˚a) = f(ak)− f (˚ak). By (1), this can be
simplified to Fk(a) = f(ak).
GCRI is too demanding if we want to make redistribution conditional on
the eﬀort people exercise. But within a liberal egalitarian framework, we will
also argue that it is not suitable. If our aim is to redistribute on the basis of
eﬀort, then general contrafactual reward captures too much. In many cases,
it will reflect both a reward part (reflecting that a person has increased her
eﬀort) and a redistribution part (reflecting that the same person gets a share
of the deficit or surplus generated by someone else increasing her eﬀort).
There is, of course, no reason to demand that the redistribution part should
be independent of the eﬀort of others, on the contrary, an essential part of
liberal egalitarian theory is precisely to make redistribution conditional on
people’s choice of eﬀort.
Hence, in order to isolate the reward part, we should focus on the following
weaker version of contrafactual reward independence.
Narrow Contrafactual Reward Independence (NCRI): For any a, a˜, aˆ, a¯ ∈
ΩN and k ∈ N , [aEk = a˜Ek , aˆEk = a¯Ek , aEk 6= aˆEk , aEi = aˆEi and a˜Ei = a¯Ei ,
∀i 6= k ∈ N ]→ [Fk(a)− Fk(aˆ) = Fk(a˜)− Fk(a¯)].
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NCRI covers situations where only a single person changes her eﬀort. In
such cases, a change in post-tax income of this person only reflects a con-
trafactual reward of eﬀort, and we propose that a liberal egalitarian should
demand that this contrafactual reward is independent of the eﬀort chosen
by others. This requirement is consistent with a wide range of redistribution
mechanisms, including both the libertarian mechanism FL and the egalitar-
ian equivalent mechanism FEE. As we will return to in section 6, however,
within the framework of EIEE, it characterizes uniquely a generalized version
of the egalitarian equivalent mechanism.
5.2 Interpersonal reward independence
The demand for general interpersonal reward independence can be written
as follows.
General Interpersonal Reward Independence (GIRI): For any a, a˜ ∈ ΩN
and j, k ∈ N , where aEj 6= aEk ,
£
aEi = a˜
E
i , i = j, k
¤
→ [Fj(a) − Fk(a) =
Fj(a˜)− Fk(a˜)].
GIRI states that the general interpersonal reward assigned to someone
exercising more eﬀort than another person should be independent of their
relative eﬀort performance in society. This captures precisely the principle
of reward independence if a person’s post-tax income is independent of her
talent. If not, then we need to consider the following weaker version.
Narrow Interpersonal Reward Independence (IRI): For any a, a˜ ∈ ΩN and
j, k ∈ N , where aTj = aTk and aEj 6= aEk , [aEi = a˜Ei , i = j, k]→ [Fj(a)−Fk(a) =
Fj(a˜)− Fk(a˜)].
NIRI only considers interpersonal reward between persons of the same
talent, where the diﬀerence in post-tax income only can be explained by dif-
ferences in eﬀort. It is satisfied by a wide range of redistribution mechanisms,
including both the libertarian mechanism FL and the egalitarian equivalent
mechanism FEE. But as we will show in section 6, if we accept a certain
restriction on the domain of the redistribution mechanism and combines it
with EIEE, we have a unique characterization of a generalized version of the
egalitarian equivalent mechanism. If we do not accept restricting the do-
main, we need GIRI in order to characterize the same class of redistribution
mechanisms.
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5.3 Overview on reward independence
In summary, most versions of the requirement of reward independence are
compatible with the principle of equalization. Only by applying a general
definition of contrafactual reward, do we get a conflict with EIEE. In this
particular case, there is a close link between the libertarian redistribution
mechanism and the requirement of reward independence.
6 The Generalized Egalitarian EquivalentMech-
anism
We will now show that each of the versions of reward independence consistent
with EIEE supports an independent characterization of a generalized version
of the egalitarian equivalent redistribution mechanism.8
FGEEk (a) = r(a
E
k )− 1n
P
i∈N
£
r(aEk )− f(ai)
¤
,∀k ∈ N , ∀a ∈ ΩN ,
where r : ΩE → <. The generalized egalitarian equivalent redistribution
mechanism consists of two parts. First it rewards all individuals according to
a given reward scheme, r(aEk ); secondly, it distributes the surplus or deficit
generated by the first part equally among them.
It turns out that there is a close link between the principle of equalization,
the principle of reward independence and FGEE. This is most easily seen in
the case where we impose general interpersonal reward independence on the
redistribution mechanism.
Proposition 6. A redistribution mechanism F satisfies EIEE and GIRI
if and only if F = FGEE.
Proof. The if part of the proposition is trivial, and hence we will only
prove the only-if part.
(1) Consider any a, a˜ ∈ ΩN and j, k, l,m ∈ N , where aEj = a˜El 6= aEk = a˜Em.
We will now prove that Fj(a)− Fk(a) = Fl(a˜)− Fm(a˜).
(2) Consider aˆ ∈ ΩN , where aˆEk = aEk , aˆEj = aEj and aˆEi = a˜Ei , ∀i 6=
j, k. By GIRI Fl(aˆ) − Fm(aˆ) = Fl(a˜) − Fm(a˜), and by EIEE Fj(aˆ) = Fl(aˆ)
and Fk(aˆ) = Fm(aˆ). Hence Fj(aˆ) − Fk(aˆ) = Fl(aˆ) − Fm(aˆ). By GIRI,
8Notice that this is also a generalization of the formulation of the egalitarian equivalent
mechanism suggested by Bossert and Fleurbaey (1996), because we do not demand any link
between r(aEk ) and the pre-tax income function f . This implies that the characterization
oﬀered in Bossert and Fleurbaey (1996) does not cover the generalized version.
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Fj(a)−Fk(a) = Fj(aˆ)−Fk(aˆ), and we have established the result announced
in (1).
(3) From (2), it follows that for any two eﬀort levels, there exists a given
diﬀerence between the post-tax income of persons exercising these two eﬀort
levels. From EIEE, it follows that there should never be any diﬀerence in
post-tax income between two persons exercising the same eﬀort. Hence it is
possible to define a function r : ΩE → < such that for any a ∈ ΩN and any
j ∈ N :
Fj(a)− F1(a) = r(aEj )− r(aE1 )
.
.
.
Fj(a)− Fn(a) = r(aEj )− r(aEn )
(4) It follows from (3) that nFj(a)−
P
i∈N Fi(a) = nr(a
E
j )−
P
i∈N r(a
E
i ).
By the no-waste condition,
P
i∈N Fi(a) =
P
i∈N fi(a), and hence we have
that Fj(a) = r(aEj )− 1n
P
i∈N
£
r(aEi )− fi(a)
¤
. The result follows.
In order to see the link between narrow contrafactual reward indepen-
dence and EIEE, let us first establish the following lemma.
Lemma 2. If a redistribution mechanism F satisfies EIEE and NCRI,
then it satisfies GIRI.
Proof. (1) We will first establish by induction that for any a, a˜ ∈ ΩN
and j, k ∈ N , where aEi = a˜Ei ,∀i 6= j, aEj 6= a˜Ej , Fi(a)−Fi(a˜) = Fk(a)−Fk(a˜),
∀i 6= j.
(2) Consider first any aˆ, a¯ ∈ ΩN , where aˆEj = aEj , a¯Ej = a˜Ej , and aˆEi =
a¯Ei = a
E
k , ∀i 6= j. By EIEE, it follows that Fi(aˆ) − Fi(a¯) = Fk(aˆ) − Fk(a¯)
∀i 6= j.
(3) Suppose that for some 2 ≤ θ ≤ n − 1 and every a1, a2 ∈ ΩN , where
a1Ej = a
E
j , a
2E
j = a˜
E
j , a
1E
k = a
E
k , a
1E
i = a
2E
i , ∀i 6= j, and the cardinality
of the set M(a1, a2) =
©
i 6= j ∈ N | a1Ei = a1Ek
ª
is MC(a1, a2) = θ, we have
that Fi(a1) − Fi(a2) = Fk(a1) − Fk(a2) = Fk(aˆ) − Fk(a¯), ∀i 6= j. Consider
now any a3, a4 ∈ ΩN where a3Ej = aEj , a4Ej = a˜Ej , a3Ek = aEk , a3Ei = a4Ei ,
∀i 6= j, and the cardinality of the setM(a3, a4) = ©i 6= j ∈ N | a3Ei = a3Ek ª is
MC(a
3, a4) = θ− 1. We will now show, in (4)-(6), that given the supposition
in the first part of this paragraph, Fi(a3) − Fi(a4) = Fk(a3) − Fk(a4) =
Fk(aˆ)− Fk(a¯), ∀i 6= j.
(4) Consider any l 6= j, k /∈ M((a3, a4) and a5, a6 ∈ ΩN , where a5i = a3i
and a6i = a
4
i , ∀i 6= l and a5El = a6El = aEk . It follows that the cardinality of the
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set M(a5, a6) is MC(a5, a6) = θ and hence from the supposition in (3) that
Fl(a
5)−Fl(a6) = Fk(aˆ)−Fk(a¯). By NCRI, Fl(a3)−Fl(a5) = Fl(a4)−Fl(a6),
i.e., Fl(a3)− Fl(a4) = Fl(a5)− Fl(a6) = Fk(aˆ)− Fk(a¯).
(5) By (4), Fi(a3)−Fi(a4) = Fk(aˆ)−Fk(a¯),∀i 6= j /∈M(a3, a4). By EIEE,
Fi(a
3)−Fi(a4) = Fk(a3)−Fk(a4), ∀i ∈M(a3, a4). By NCRI, Fj(a3)−Fj(a4)
= Fj(aˆ)− Fj(a¯).
(6) By the no-waste condition,
P
i∈N(Fi(a
3) − Fi(a4)) =
P
i∈N(f(a
3) −
f(a4)) and
P
i∈N(Fi(aˆ)− Fi(a¯)) =
P
i∈N(f(aˆ)− f(a¯)). By the definition of
aˆ, a¯ in (2) and a3, a4 in (3),
P
i∈N(f(a
3)− f(a4)) =
P
i∈N(f(aˆ)− f(a¯)), and
thus
P
i∈N(Fi(a
3)− Fi(a4)) =
P
i∈N(Fi(aˆ)− Fi(a¯)). By taking into account
(5), this implies that Fi(a3) − Fi(a4) = Fk(aˆ) − Fk(a¯), ∀i ∈ M(a3, a4). In
sum, in (4) - (6), we have established that Fi(a3)−Fi(a4) = Fk(a3)−Fk(a4)
= Fk(aˆ)− Fk(a¯), ∀i 6= j, as announced in (3).
(7) In (2), MC(aˆ, a¯) = n− 1. Hence, taking together (2) - (6), it follows,
by induction, that for any ar, as ∈ ΩN , where arEj = aEj , asEj = a˜Ej , arEk = aEk ,
arEi = a
sE
i , ∀i 6= j, we have that Fi(ar) − Fi(as) = Fk(ar) − Fk(as), ∀i 6= j.
The result announced in (1) follows by observing that we may define ar = a
and as = a˜.
(8) Given (7), we can establish that the redistribution mechanism satisfies
GIRI, to wit that for any a, a˜ ∈ ΩN and j, k ∈ N , where aEi = a˜Ei , i = j, k
and aEj 6= aEk , Fj(a˜ ) − Fj(a) = Fk(a˜) − Fk(a). Consider the sequence of
alternatives at ∈ ΩN , where t = 0...n, a0 = a, att = a˜t, and ati = at−1i ,
∀i 6= t. If at 6= at−1, then it follows from (7) that Fj(at) − Fj(at−1) =
Fk(a
t)− Fk(at−1) for every t = 1, ..., n. The result follows by observing that
an = a˜ and Fi(a˜)−Fi(a) =
P
t=1,...,n(Fi(a
t)−Fi(at−1)), ∀i ∈ N , which implies
that Fj(a˜ )− Fj(a) = Fk(a˜)− Fk(a).
We are now ready to report the following proposition.
Proposition 7. A redistribution mechanism F satisfies EIEE and NCRI
if and only if F = FGEE.
Proof. The result follows from combining Lemma 2 and Proposition 6.
Finally, we may even weaken our demand for interpersonal reward inde-
pendence and still establish a characterization of FGEE. In this case, how-
ever, we have to assume restricted domain richness and apply the anonymity
condition A.
Proposition 8: Given restricted domain richness, a redistribution mech-
anism F satisfies EIEE, NIRI and A if and only if F = FGEE.
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Proof. The if part of the proposition is trivial, and hence we will only
prove the only-if part.
(1) Consider any a, a˜ ∈ Ω¯N and j, k ∈
©
i ∈ N | aEi = a˜Ei
ª
, where aEj 6=
aEk . We will now show that F satisfies GIRI, i.e., that Fj(a) − Fk(a) =
Fj(a˜)− Fk(a˜).
(2) By restricted domain richness, there exist l,m 6= j, k ∈ N such that
aEl = a˜
E
m = a
E
j and a
T
l = a
T
m = a
T
k , and aˆ ∈ Ω¯N , where aˆEi = a˜Ei , ∀i 6= l,m
and aˆEm = a˜
E
l and aˆ
E
l = a˜
E
m. By A, Fi(aˆ) = Fi(a˜),∀i 6= l,m, Fm(aˆ) = Fl(a˜)
and Fl(aˆ) = Fm(a˜).
(3) By (2), Fj(a) − Fj(a˜) = Fj(a) − Fj(aˆ). By EIEE, Fj(a) = Fl(a)
and Fj(aˆ) = Fl(aˆ), and hence Fj(a) − Fj(aˆ) = Fl(a) − Fl(aˆ). By NIRI,
Fl(a) − Fl(aˆ) = Fk(a) − Fk(aˆ). By (2), Fk(a) − Fk(aˆ) = Fk(a) − Fk(a˜).
Hence, taken together, Fj(a)− Fj(a˜) = Fk(a)− Fk(a˜), i.e., Fj(a)− Fk(a) =
Fj(a˜)− Fk(a˜) and we have established the result announced in (1).
(4) Even though we have now established that F satisfies GIRI, Propo-
sition 6 does not apply immediately. Step (2) in the proof of Proposi-
tion 6 is not valid given restricted domain richness. Hence, we will have
to show independently that for any a, a˜ ∈ Ω¯N and j, k, l,m ∈ N , where
aEj = a˜
E
l 6= aEk = a˜Em, Fj(a)− Fk(a) = Fl(a˜)− Fm(a˜).
(5) By restricted domain richness, we know that there exist r, s, u, v ∈
Ω¯N , where aTr = aTs = aTu = aTv and aEr = aEj , aEs = aEk , a˜Eu = a˜El , and
a˜Ev = a˜
E
m.
9 Consider aˆ ∈ Ω¯N , where aˆEr = a˜Eu , aˆEu = a˜Er , and aˆEi = a˜Ei ,
∀i 6= r, u. By A, Fr(aˆ) = Fu(a˜), Fu(aˆ) = Fr(a˜), and Fi(aˆ) = Fi(a˜), ∀i 6= r, u.
(6) Consider a¯ ∈ Ω¯N , where a¯Es = aˆEv , a¯Ev = aˆEs , and a¯Ei = aˆEi , ∀i 6= s, v.
By A, Fs(a¯) = Fv(aˆ), Fv(a¯) = Fs(aˆ), and Fi(a¯) = Fi(aˆ), ∀i 6= s, v. Hence,
we have that Fr(a¯) − Fs(a¯) = Fr(aˆ) − Fv(aˆ) = Fu(a˜) − Fv(a˜). By EIEE,
Fu(a˜)− Fv(a˜) = Fl(a˜)− Fm(a˜), i.e., Fl(a˜)− Fm(a˜) = Fr(a¯)− Fs(a¯).
(6) By GIRI, it follows that Fr(a) − Fs(a) = Fr(a¯) − Fs(a¯). By EIEE,
Fr(a)−Fs(a) = Fj(a)−Fk(a), i.e., Fj(a)−Fk(a) = Fr(a¯)−Fs(a¯). Hence, tak-
ing into account (6), Fj(a)−Fk(a) = Fl(a˜)−Fm(a˜), and we have established
the result announced in (4).
(7) The proposition follows from applying (6) in steps (3) and (4) of the
proof of Proposition 6, which also are valid given restricted domain richness.
To see that the propositions provide independent characterizations of
9Notice that r, j, u and s,m, v do not have to be distinct persons. Hence, as in the
other proofs, we only need n ≥ 4.
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FGEE, let us consider the relationship between NCR, GIRI, and NIRI. Clearly,
GIRI implies NIRI. But we have to restrict the domain in Proposition 8, and
hence it follows that Proposition 8 is distinct from both Proposition 6 and
Proposition 7.
What about the relationship between NCRI and the two interpersonal re-
ward independence conditions? Consider the redistribution mechanism con-
sisting of the following two parts. First, everyone is given a transfer equal
to the pre-tax income they would have had if they were the most talented
and, second, the overall deficit from the first part is divided equally among
the most talented in society. This mechanism satisfies NCRI (where con-
trafactual reward always is equal to the marginal productivity of the most
talented), but it does not satisfy GIRI (because people do not share equally
in the deficit created when people not in possession of the highest level of
talent change their eﬀort). If we impose the further assumption that we only
distribute the deficit among those who exercise the highest level of eﬀort
within the most talented group, then it will not even satisfy NIRI.
On the other hand, consider the redistribution mechanism where the first
part consists of giving a person half of her pre-tax income if there is someone
else exercising more eﬀort but all of the pre-tax income if she is the one
exercising most eﬀort in society, and the second part consists of dividing the
overall surplus from the first part equally among everyone in the economy.
This redistribution mechanism clearly violates NCRI (because contrafactual
reward depends on whether you are the one exercising most eﬀort or not), but
it satisfies GIRI and NIRI (because everyone shares equally in any surplus or
deficit created by a change in someone else’s eﬀort). Certainly, none of these
redistribution mechanisms satisfy EIEE, and it is only within the framework
of this basic egalitarian condition that they all single out the generalized
egalitarian equivalent redistribution mechanism.
7 Conclusion
Liberal egalitarians want to reward people for factors under their control.
But how can this be done? We have studied the implications of two general
liberal egalitarian ideas, to wit that people should be rewarded equally and
that the reward structure should be independent of other people’s eﬀort.
The exact nature of these principles, however, depends on how we define the
concept of reward. We have proposed the distinction between contrafactual
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and interpersonal reward, and within each of the categories we have outlined
a general and a narrow definition. In sum, as shown in Table 1, this has
provided us with eight diﬀerent reward conditions.
Reward conditions Equal Reward Reward Independence
General contrafactual reward EGCR GCRI
Narrow contrafactual reward NGCR NCRI
General interpersonal reward EGIR GIRI
Narrow interpersonal reward NGIR NIRI
Table 1. Reward conditions.
In the main part of this paper, we have studied the implications of impos-
ing these reward conditions on the redistribution mechanism. Table 2 gives
an overview of the results.
It turns out that it is in general not possible to satisfy the principle of
equal contrafactual reward. There is no redistribution mechanism satisfying
the general version, while the narrow version is in conflict with the principle
of equalization. This shows that, even without taking into account incentive
considerations, it is not possible to establish a redistribution mechanism that
is truly egalitarian in all respects.
The equal interpersonal reward requirement is less demanding. Equal
narrow interpersonal reward is satisfied by any anonymous redistribution
mechanism, whereas equal general interpersonal reward and the principle of
equalization characterize a broad group of egalitarian redistribution mecha-
nism.
The principle of reward independence follows from the liberal egalitarian
idea that people only should be held responsible for factors under their con-
trol. Interestingly, it turns out that all versions of this principle compatible
with the principle of equalization, support a characterization of the same
class of redistribution mechanisms, to wit, the generalized egalitarian equiv-
alent redistribution mechanism. This class of redistribution mechanisms also
satisfies all versions of the principle of equal reward compatible with the
principle of equalization, and thus we conclude that it constitutes the most
promising approach to liberal egalitarian reasoning.
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Condition Implications
EGCR Not compatible with any redis-
tribution mechanism satisfying
no waste.
ENCR Not compatible with EIEE.
EGIR Characterises a broad class of
egalitarian redistribution mech-
anisms (together with EIEE).
NGIR Satisfied by any anonymous re-
distribution mechanism
GCRI Characterizes the libertarian
redistribution mechanism (to-
gether with NREEP).
NCRI Characterises the generalized
egalitarian equivalent mecha-
nism (together with EIEE).
GIRI Characterises the generalized
egalitarian equivalent mecha-
nism (together with EIEE).
NIRI Characterises the generalized
egalitarian equivalent mech-
anism (together with EIEE,
within a restricted domain).
Table 2. Implications of the reward conditions.
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